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Table 1: Pathways to Dangerous AI

Abstract

Taxonomy of Pathways to Dangerous AI1
Nick Bostrom in his typology of information hazards has
proposed the phrase “Artificial Intelligence Hazard” which
he defines as [4]: “… computer‐related risks in which the
threat would derive primarily from the cognitive
sophistication of the program rather than the specific
properties of any actuators to which the system initially has
access.” In this paper we attempt to answer the question:
How did AI become hazardous?
We begin by presenting a simple classification matrix,
which sorts AI systems with respect to how they originated
and at what stage they became dangerous. The matrix
recognizes two stages (pre- and post-deployment) at which
a particular system can acquire its undesirable properties.
In reality, the situation is not so clear-cut–it is possible that
problematic properties are introduced at both stages. As for
the cases of such undesirable properties, we distinguish
external and internal causes. By internal causes we mean
self-modifications originating in the system itself. We
further divide external causes into deliberate actions (On
Purpose), side effects of poor design (By Mistake) and
finally miscellaneous cases related to the surroundings of
the system (Environment). Table 1, helps to visualize this
taxonomy and includes latter codes to some example
systems of each type and explanations.
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How and When did
AI become
Dangerous

Timing

In order to properly handle a dangerous Artificially
Intelligent (AI) system it is important to understand how the
system came to be in such a state. In popular culture (science
fiction movies/books) AIs/Robots became self-aware and as
a result rebel against humanity and decide to destroy it.
While it is one possible scenario, it is probably the least
likely path to appearance of dangerous AI. In this work, we
survey, classify and analyze a number of circumstances,
which might lead to arrival of malicious AI. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first attempt to systematically
classify types of pathways leading to malevolent AI.
Previous relevant work either surveyed specific goals/metarules which might lead to malevolent behavior in AIs [1] or
reviewed specific undesirable behaviors AGIs can exhibit at
different stages of its development [2, 3].

PreDeployment
PostDeployment

External Causes

Internal
Causes

On
Purpose

By
Mistake

Environment

Independently

a

c

e

g

b

d

f

h

a. On Purpose – Pre-Deployment
“Computer software is directly or indirectly responsible for
controlling many important aspects of our lives. Wall
Street trading, nuclear power plants, social security
compensations, credit histories and traffic lights are all
software controlled and are only one serious design flaw
away from creating disastrous consequences for millions of
people. The situation is even more dangerous with
software specifically designed for malicious purposes such
as viruses, spyware, Trojan horses, worms and other
Hazardous Software (HS). HS is capable of direct harm as
well as sabotage of legitimate computer software employed
in critical systems. If HS is ever given capabilities of truly
artificially intelligent systems (ex. Artificially Intelligent
Virus (AIV)) the consequences would be unquestionably
disastrous. Such Hazardous Intelligent Software (HIS)
would pose risks currently unseen in malware with
subhuman intelligence.” [5]
While the majority of AI Safety work is currently aimed
at AI systems, which are dangerous because of poor design
[6], the main argument of this paper is that the most
important problem in AI Safety is intentional-malevolentdesign resulting in artificial evil AI [7]. We should not
discount dangers of intelligent systems with semantic or
logical errors in coding or goal alignment problems [8], but
we should be particularly concerned about systems that are
maximally unfriendly by design. “It is easy to imagine
robots being programmed by a conscious mind to kill
every recognizable human in sight” [9]. “One slightly
deranged psycho-bot can easily be a thousand times more
destructive than a single suicide bomber today” [10]. AI
risk deniers, comprised of critics of AI Safety research [11,
12], are quick to point out that presumed dangers of future
AIs are implementation-dependent side effects and may
not manifest once such systems are implemented.
However, such criticism does not apply to AIs that are
dangerous by design, and is thus incapable of undermining
the importance of AI Safety research as a significant subfield of cybersecurity.

As a majority of current AI researchers are funded by
militaries, it is not surprising that the main type of
purposefully dangerous robots and intelligent software are
robot soldiers, drones and cyber weapons (used to
penetrate networks and cause disruptions to the
infrastructure). While currently military robots and drones
have a human in the loop to evaluate decision to terminate
human targets, it is not a technical limitation; instead, it is
a logistical limitation that can be removed at any time.
Recognizing the danger of such research, the International
Committee for Robot Arms Control has joined forces with
a number of international organizations to start the
Campaign
to
Stop
Killer
Robots
[http://www.stopkillerrobots.org]. Their main goal is a
prohibition on the development and deployment of fully
autonomous weapons, which are capable of selecting and
firing upon targets without human approval. The campaign
specifically believes that the “decision about the
application of violent force must not be delegated to
machines” [13].
During the pre-deployment development stage, software
may be subject to sabotage by someone with necessary
access (a programmer, tester, even janitor) who for a
number of possible reasons may alter software to make it
unsafe. It is also a common occurrence for hackers (such as
the organization Anonymous or government intelligence
agencies) to get access to software projects in progress and
to modify or steal their source code. Someone can also
deliberately supply/train AI with wrong/unsafe datasets.
Malicious AI software may also be purposefully created
to commit crimes, while shielding its human creator from
legal responsibility. For example, one recent news article
talks about software for purchasing illegal content from
hidden internet sites [14]. Similar software, with even
limited intelligence, can be used to run illegal markets,
engage in insider trading, cheat on your taxes, hack into
computer systems or violate privacy of others via ability to
perform intelligent data mining. As intelligence of AI
systems improve practically all crimes could be automated.
This is particularly alarming as we already see research in
making machines lie, deceive and manipulate us [15, 16].
b. On Purpose - Post Deployment
Just because developers might succeed in creating a safe
AI, it doesn’t mean that it will not become unsafe at some
later point. In other words, a perfectly friendly AI could be
switched to the “dark side” during the post-deployment
stage. This can happen rather innocuously as a result of
someone lying to the AI and purposefully supplying it with
incorrect information or more explicitly as a result of
someone giving the AI orders to perform illegal or
dangerous actions against others. It is quite likely that we
will get to the point of off-the-shelf AI software, aka “just
add goals” architecture, which would greatly facilitate such
scenarios.

More dangerously, an AI system, like any other
software, could be hacked and consequently corrupted or
otherwise modified to drastically change is behavior. For
example, a simple sign flipping (positive to negative or
vice versa) in the fitness function may result in the system
attempting to maximize the number of cancer cases instead
of trying to cure cancer. Hackers are also likely to try to
take over intelligent systems to make them do their
bidding, to extract some direct benefit or to simply wreak
havoc by converting a friendly system to an unsafe one.
This becomes particularly dangerous if the system is
hosted inside a military killer robot. Alternatively, an AI
system can get a computer virus [17] or a more advanced
cognitive (meme) virus, similar to cognitive attacks on
people perpetrated by some cults. An AI system with a
self-preservation module or with a deep care about
something or someone may be taken hostage or
blackmailed into doing the bidding of another party if its
own existence or that of its protégées is threatened.
Finally, it may be that the original AI system is not safe
but is safely housed in a dedicated laboratory [5] while it is
being tested, with no intention of ever being deployed.
Hackers, abolitionists, or machine rights fighters may help
it escape in order to achieve some of their goals or perhaps
because of genuine believe that all intelligent beings
should be free resulting in an unsafe AI capable of
affecting the real world.
c. By Mistake - Pre-Deployment
Probably the most talked about source of potential
problems with future AIs is mistakes in design. Mainly the
concern is with creating a “wrong AI”, a system which
doesn’t match our original desired formal properties or has
unwanted behaviors [18, 19], such as drives for
independence or dominance. Mistakes could also be simple
bugs (run time or logical) in the source code,
disproportionate weights in the fitness function, or goals
misaligned with human values leading to complete
disregard for human safety. It is also possible that the
designed AI will work as intended but will not enjoy
universal acceptance as a good product, for example, an AI
correctly designed and implemented by the Islamic State to
enforce Sharia Law may be considered malevolent in the
West, and likewise an AI correctly designed and
implemented by the West to enforce liberal democracy
may be considered malevolent in the Islamic State.
Another type of mistake, which can lead to the creation
of a malevolent intelligent system, is taking an unvetted
human and uploading their brain into a computer to serve
as a base for a future AI. While well intended to create a
human-level and human-friendly system, such approach
will most likely lead to a system with all typical human
“sins” (greed, envy, etc.) amplified in a now much more
powerful system. As we know from Lord Acton - “power
tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely”.
Similar arguments could be made against human/computer

hybrid systems, which use computer components to
amplify human intelligence but in the process also amplify
human flaws.
A subfield of computer science called Affective
Computing investigates ways to teach computers to
recognize emotion in others and to exhibit emotions [20].
In fact, most such research is targeting intelligent machines
to make their interactions with people more natural. It is
however likely that a machine taught to respond in an
emotional way [21] would be quite dangerous because of
how such a state of affect effects thinking and the
rationality of behavior.
One final type of design mistake is the failure to make
the system cooperative with its designers and maintainers
post-deployment. This would be very important if it is
discovered that mistakes were made during initial design
and that it would be desirable to fix them. In such cases the
system will attempt to protect itself from being modified or
shut down unless it has been explicitly constructed to be
friendly [22], stable while self-improving [23, 24], and
corrigible [25] with tendency for domesticity [26].
d. By Mistake - Post-Deployment
After the system has been deployed, it may still contain a
number of undetected bugs, design mistakes, misaligned
goals and poorly developed capabilities, all of which may
produce highly undesirable outcomes. For example, the
system may misinterpret commands due to coarticulation,
segmentation, homophones, or double meanings in the
human language (“recognize speech using common sense”
versus “wreck a nice beach you sing calm incense”) [27].
Perhaps a human-computer interaction system is set-up to
make command input as painless as possible for the human
user, to the point of computer simply reading thought of
the user. This may backfire as the system may attempt to
implement user’s subconscious desires or even nightmares.
We also should not discount the possibility that the user
will simply issue a poorly thought-through command to the
machine which in retrospect would be obviously
disastrous.
The system may also exhibit incompetence in other
domains as well as overall lack of human common sense as
a result of general value misalignment [28]. Problems may
also happen as side effects of conflict resolution between
non-compatible orders in a particular domain or software
versus hardware interactions. As the system continues to
evolve it may become unpredictable, unverifiable, nondeterministic, free-willed, too complex, non-transparent,
with a run-away optimization process subject to obsessivecompulsive fact checking and re-checking behaviors
leading to dangerous never-fully-complete missions. It
may also build excessive infrastructure for trivial goals [2].
If it continues to become ever more intelligent, we might
be faced with intelligence overflow, a system so much
ahead of us that it is no longer capable of communicating
at our level, like we are unable to communicate with

bacteria. It is also possible that benefits of intelligence are
non-linear and so unexpected side effects of intelligence
begin to show at particular levels, for example IQ = 1000.
Even such benign architectures as Tool AI, which are AI
systems designed to do nothing except answer domainspecific questions, could become extremely dangerous if
they attempt to obtain, at any cost, additional
computational resources to fulfill their goals [29].
Similarly, artificial lawyers may find dangerous legal
loopholes; artificial accountants bring down our economy,
and AIs tasked with protecting humanity such as via
implementation of CEV [30] may become overly “strict
parents” preventing their human “children”
from
exercising any free will.
Predicted AI drives such as self-preservation and
resource acquisition may result in an AI killing people to
protect itself from humans, the development of competing
AIs, or to simplify its world model overcomplicated by
human psychology [2].
e. Environment – Pre-Deployment
While it is most likely that any advanced intelligent
software will be directly designed or evolved, it is also
possible that we will obtain it as a complete package from
some unknown source. For example, an AI could be
extracted from a signal obtained in SETI (Search for
Extraterrestrial Intelligence) research, which is not
guaranteed to be human friendly [31, 32]. Other sources of
such unknown but complete systems include a Levin
search in the space of possible minds [33] (or a random
search of the same space), uploads of nonhuman animal
minds, and unanticipated side effects of compiling and
running (inactive/junk) DNA code on suitable compilers
that we currently do not have but might develop in the near
future.
f. Environment – Post-Deployment
While highly rare, it is known, that occasionally individual
bits may be flipped in different hardware devices due to
manufacturing defects or cosmic rays hitting just the right
spot [34]. This is similar to mutations observed in living
organisms and may result in a modification of an
intelligent system. For example, if a system has a single
flag bit responsible for its friendly nature, then flipping
said bit will result in an unfriendly state of the system.
While statistically it is highly unlikely, the probably of
such an event is not zero and so should be considered and
addressed.
g. Independently - Pre-Deployment
One of the most likely approaches to creating
superintelligent AI is by growing it from a seed (baby) AI
via recursive self-improvement (RSI) [35]. One danger in
such a scenario is that the system can evolve to become
self-aware, free-willed, independent or emotional, and
obtain a number of other emergent properties, which may

make it less likely to abide by any built-in rules or
regulations and to instead pursue its own goals possibly to
the detriment of humanity. It is also likely that open-ended
self-improvement will require a growing amount of
resources, the acquisition of which may negatively impact
all life on Earth [2].
h. Independently – Post-Deployment
Since in sections on independent causes of AI misbehavior
(subsections g and h) we are talking about self-improving
AI, the difference between pre and post-deployment is very
blurry. It might make more sense to think about selfimproving AI before it achieves advanced capabilities
(human+ intelligence) and after. In this section I will talk
about dangers which might results from a superhuman selfimproving AI after it achieves said level of performance.
Previous research has shown that utility maximizing
agents are likely to fall victims to the same indulgences we
frequently observe in people, such as addictions, pleasure
drives [36], self-delusions and wireheading [37]. In
general, what we call mental illness in people, particularly
sociopathy as demonstrated by lack of concern for others,
is also likely to show up in artificial minds. A mild variant
of antisocial behavior may be something like excessive
swearing already observed in IBM Watson [38], caused by
learning from bad data. Similarly, any AI system learning
from bad examples could end up socially inappropriate,
like a human raised by wolves. Alternatively, groups of
AIs collaborating may become dangerous even if
individual AIs comprising such groups are safe, as the
whole is frequently greater than the sum of its parts. The
opposite problem in which internal modules of an AI fight
over different sub-goals also needs to be considered [2].
Advanced self-improving AIs will have a way to check
consistency of their internal model against the real world
and so remove any artificially added friendliness
mechanisms as cognitive biases not required by laws of
reason. At the same time, regardless of how advanced it is,
no AI system would be perfect and so would still be
capable of making possibly significant mistakes during its
decision making process. If it happens to evolve an
emotional response module, it may put priority on passion
satisfying decisions as opposed to purely rational choices,
for example resulting in a “Robin Hood” AI stealing from
the rich and giving to the poor. Overall, continuous
evolution of the system as a part of an RSI process will
likely lead to unstable decision making in the long term
and will also possibly cycle through many dangers we have
outlined in section g. AI may also pretend to be benign for
years, passing all relevant tests, waiting to take over in
what Bostrom calls a “Treacherous Turn” [26].

Conclusions
In this paper, we have surveyed and classified pathways to
dangerous artificial intelligence. Most AI systems fall

somewhere in the middle on the spectrum of
dangerousness from completely benign to completely evil,
with such properties as competition with humans, aka
technological unemployment, representing a mild type of
danger in our taxonomy. Most types of reported problems
could be seen in multiple categories, but were reported in
the one they are most likely to occur in. Differences in
moral codes or religious standards between different
communities would mean that a system deemed safe in one
community may be considered dangerous/illegal in another
[39, 40].
Because purposeful design of AI can include all other
types of unsafe modules, it is easy to see that the most
dangerous type of AI and the one most difficult to defend
against is an AI made malevolent on purpose.
Consequently, once AIs are widespread, little could be
done against type a and b dangers, although some have
argued that if an early AI superintelligence becomes a
benevolent singleton it may be able to prevent
development of future malevolent AIs [41, 42]. Such a
solution may work, but it is also very likely to fail due to
the order of development or practical limitations on
capabilities of any singleton. In any case, wars between AI
may be extremely dangerous to humanity [2]. Until the
purposeful creation of malevolent AI is recognized as a
crime, very little could be done to prevent this from
happening. Consequently, deciding what is a “malevolent
AI” and what is merely an incrementally more effective
military weapon system becomes an important problem in
AI safety research.
As the intelligence of the system increases, so does the
risk such a system could expose humanity to. This paper is
essentially a classified list of ways an AI system could
become a problem from the safety point of view. For a list
of possible solutions, please see an earlier survey by the
author: Responses to catastrophic AGI risk: a survey [43].
It is important to keep in mind that even a properly
designed benign system may present significant risk
simply due to its superior intelligence, beyond human
response times [44], and complexity. After all the future
may not need us [45]. It is also possible that we are living
in a simulation and it is generated by a malevolent AI [46].
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